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1 Introduction and Literature Review
Environmental policy-making has recently followed trends of emphasizing preventive measures over
end-of-pipe approaches, focusing on environmental performance of products throughout their life-
cycles, and favoring goal-oriented and market-based approaches over traditional command-and-control
approaches. An excellent example of such policy-making is Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR),
which is a goal-oriented approach to improve total life-cycle environmental performance of products
(Tojo 2004). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines EPR as
an environmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility for its product is extended to
the post-consumer stage of the product’s life-cycle. There are two related features of any EPR policy
- the shifting of responsibility (physically and/or economically, fully or partially) upstream toward
the producer and away from municipalities, and, providing incentives to producers to incorporate
environmental considerations in the design of their products. A broader definition of EPR according
to Lindhqvist (1992) is as follows: Extended Producer Responsibility is an environmental protection
strategy to reach an environmental objective of a decreased total environmental impact from a product,
by making the manufacturer of the product responsible for the entire life-cycle of the product and
especially for the take-back, recycling and final disposal of the product. Extended Producer Responsibility
is implemented through administrative, economic and informative instruments. The composition of
these instruments determines the precise form of Extended Producer Responsibility.
Under conventional waste management practices, local or municipal governments are responsible for
the collection and disposal of end-of-life products, and the costs of collection and disposal are generally
financed through taxes. EPR shifts financial responsibility for the costs of waste management upstream
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to the beneficiaries of the product, and away from the municipality and the taxpayer. EPR is designed
to confront the producer with the costs of product disposal, and to, hence, provide incentives for the
producer to take these costs into account in product design and marketing. Under EPR, firms have
an incentive to design products that result in lower waste disposal costs or that facilitate material
and/or energy recovery. The principle of EPR has been reflected in many waste management policy
initiatives, starting with the German Duales System Deutschland (DSD), launched by the packaging
industry in response to the German Packaging Ordinance of 1991. Since then, EPR policies have been
implemented and applied to municipal solid wastes, hazardous wastes, and special wastes from both the
residential as well as the commercial sectors.1 EPR helps realize objectives of sustainable development
by reducing waste, reducing the release of potentially toxic chemicals into the environment, reducing
the use of virgin material inputs, and reducing energy consumption (OECD 2005).
EPR instruments can be categorized into three broad types - take-back requirements, economic
instruments, and performance standards. Take-back requirements assign responsibilities to the benefi-
ciaries of products for end-of-life product management. Economic instruments such as deposit/refund
systems, advance disposal fees, and material taxes are incentive-based and provide flexibility in estab-
lishing the means to accomplish the EPR target. Performance standards, such as minimum recycled
content, can be set to specify a particular percentage of materials to be recovered and reused. To
date, OECD member governments have used EPR to stimulate changes in three key priority areas
- resource efficiency, cleaner products, and waste management. Examples of EPR instruments from
practice include:2
i. Product Take-Back and/or Recovery Targets: Specified Home Appliance Recycling (SHAR) Law
in Japan mandating recovery/reuse targets in terms of product weight; Ordinance on Producer
Responsibility for Cars in Sweden making manufacturers and importers of cars in Sweden respon-
sible for accepting end-of-life vehicles; German Packaging Ordinance mandating recycling/reuse
targets for product packaging; Used Oil/Containers/Filters Industry Management Program of
Western Canada for the collection and processing of used oil, oil containers and oil filters.
1EPR programs have thus far been applied to packaging, paint, batteries, electronics, cell phones, tires, used engine
oil, appliances, and vehicles.
2Sources: US Environmental Protection Agency (http://www.epa.gov/otaq/mpg.htm), UK Department for Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs (http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/eu/), New Zealand





ii. Deposit/Refund Systems: Deposit/Refund Systems for beverage containers, batteries and tires in
certain states in the US; Deposit/Refund Systems for food containers, tires, batteries, lubricants,
pesticide containers, and plastics in South Korea.
iii. Advance Disposal Fees: Advance disposal fees charged by manufacturers facing the SHAR law
to consumers of white goods in Japan; Paint Stewardship Program in British Columbia where
“eco-fees” are charged to customers at the point of sale.
iv. Product Design Standards: Recycled Content of Newsprint Bill in the UK specifying minimum
recycled content for newsprint; European Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste which
limits concentration levels of lead, cadmium, mercury and hexavalent chromium in packaging
or packaging components3; Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the US re-
quiring vehicle manufacturers to comply with fuel economy standards set by the Department of
Transportation.
v. Costs/Charges for Environmental Impact during Product Use: Costs for Carbon Dioxide emis-
sions incurred by firms in the European Union subject to the EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading Program; Gas Guzzler Tax in the US, imposed on manufacturers on the sale of cars
failing to meet fuel economy standards.
vi. Material Taxes: “Eco-tax” on PVC in Belgium and Denmark aimed at shifting consumption
away from PVC.
vii. Other Measures: In addition to the above instruments, a variety of measures have been imple-
mented in practice to complement and support the goals of EPR policies and programs. Examples
include eco-labelling, green procurement, and product stewardship.
Thus, it is evident that EPR has been implemented through a variety of instruments across coun-
tries. The OECD, in its Guidance Manual for Governments (OECD 2001), describes anticipated
actions by producers in direct response to EPR instruments. The principal rationale behind EPR is
that manufacturers have the capacity to effect changes at the product and process design stage in order
to reduce the environmental impacts of products. However, very little research has been conducted to
3Over thirty-five states in the US have enacted some type of product or packaging restrictions. For example, Rhode
Island prohibits non-biodegradable plastic carrier rings, packaging containing potentially toxic heavy metals, metal bever-
age containers with detachable flip tops, plastic food or beverage containers composed of more than one resin, degradable
plastic containers which interfere with recycling, and telephone directory binders which interfere with recycling. See
http://www.ilsr.org/recycling/epr/tools.html.
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evaluate the influence EPR programs have on the design of products and product systems, i.e., up-
stream changes (Tojo 2004). In a survey-based empirical study covering twenty one manufacturers of
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (EEE) and cars in Japan and Sweden subject to EPR legislation,
Tojo (2004) concludes that upstream measures, in terms of reduction of hazardous substances and
source reduction of material consumption through reuse and recycling, have been undertaken in the
two industry sectors in both countries. We paraphrase the survey4 by Tojo (2004) in Appendix A, to
elucidate the nature of EPR legislation in Japan (for EEE) and in Sweden (for automobiles), and the
measures taken by manufacturers in response to EPR legislation.
According to the OECD Guidance Manual for Governments (OECD 2001), the application of an
EPR instrument to a particular product, product group, or waste stream should take into account
the feasibility of steering producer and consumer behavior in a particular direction; the allocation of
physical and financial responsibility will affect the applicability of the EPR instrument. It is clear that
manufacturers have responded to EPR instruments by changing product designs in order to minimize
environmental impacts of products both during use (e.g., through improved energy efficiency) as well
as after use (e.g., through design for disassembly and reuse). In other words, manufacturers have re-
sponded by taking proactive and preventive upstream measures rather than reactive and topical ones
such as treatment of waste. Having empirically described the nature of upstream responses by man-
ufacturers to EPR instruments, we proceed to analytically establish how various implementations of
EPR influence upstream actions by a manufacturer producing and selling a remanufacturable product.
Specifically, we model two environmental design attributes of a durable, remanufacturable product - a
one-dimensional “more is better” measure of environmental performance (such as energy efficiency) q,
and a measure of remanufacturability θ (modeled as the fraction of the product that can be recovered
after use). q influences the environmental performance of the product during use by the customer
while θ influences the end-of-life environmental performance of the product. Thus, q and θ together
constitute measures of environmental performance of the product - both during, and at the end of the
product’s economic life.
Prior research on waste policy instruments and environmentally favorable product design examines
economic and social efficiencies of various policy instruments such as taxes, subsidies, standards, com-
bined taxes/subsidies, and take-back. For example, see Calcott & Walls 2002, Eichner & Pethig 2001,
Calcott & Walls 2000, Fullerton & Wu 1998, Palmer & Walls 1997, Dinan 1993. The typical objective
in this stream of research is for the social planner to maximize net social surplus subject to resource
4Due to the confidential nature of the information obtained and as per requests by interviewees, references to individual
companies are not made in the report by Tojo (2004).
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constraints, material balance constraints, and production functions. Material input consumption is
treated as a surrogate for product design; an environmentally favorable design implies lower material
consumption. Customer demand for the manufacturer’s product is a function of the quantity pro-
duced, product price, income, and quantity of waste disposed. A consistent finding is that a combined
tax/subsidy, where there is a tax on the consumption good supply and a subsidy on the demand for
material input, can yield the socially optimal product design and quantity of waste. However, Calcott
& Walls (2000) argue that the infeasibility of paying households for recycling, and taxing products
according to their recyclability implies that the first-best outcome is no longer attainable from a prac-
tical standpoint.5 They set up a constrained second-best optimum and solve for policy instruments
that achieve this outcome and find that a disposal fee combined with upstream instruments such as
recycled content standards and subsidies can achieve the second-best optimum. We, however, do not
engage in such debate, nor do we restrict our analysis to a specific policy instrument. We characterize
optimal upstream design and price choices by firms in response to any given EPR legislation.
We model a manufacturer supplying a remanufacturable, durable good to a knowledgeable cus-
tomer.6 The customer has a continuing need for the services of the product and optimizes between the
costs of replacement and the costs of equipment operation. We assume that product and process tech-
nologies are fairly stable and product life-cycles are reasonably long so that remanufacturing is viable
to both the manufacturer as well as the customer. An example is a diesel truck engine manufactured by
Cummins or Detroit Diesel sold to truck fleets such as UPS and FedEx. Product deterioration implies
that operating costs increase with time. We assume that the price and profit advantage afforded by
remanufacturing is a valid inducement for the knowledgeable customer to demand a remanufactured
product and for the manufacturer to offer a remanufactured product. In contrast to the aforementioned
literature in which customer demand or utility depends upon the output produced and the amount
of material consumed or disposed, our model explicitly incorporates the manufacturer’s design choices
of performance and remanufacturability into an individual customer’s product replacement decision,
given that these design choices directly influence costs to the customer. Demand for the manufacturer’s
5Nor do we observe combined taxes/subsidies being implemented in practice.
6The reader is directed to Lund (2003) for a comprehensive account of about 275 firms in the remanufacturing industry.
The report covers aspects such as product and process design, sales and marketing, workforce, capital investment, costs,
and strategic barriers and opportunities in the industry. According to the report, remanufactured products are tested to
original performance specifications, they often carry warranties comparable to that of new products, and they are sold in
the market at about 45% to 65% of equivalent new product prices. Frequent and expert buyers who possess substantial
ongoing experience in purchasing remanufactured products and in evaluating a remanufactured product’s performance
objectively are most often found in commercial and industrial markets. These are the markets in which remanufactured
products are most common.
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product via customer replacements is thus connected with design choices through the costs faced by the
customer. We explore how various attributes and implementations of EPR, in terms of the magnitudes
of environmental costs during product use and waste disposal costs post customer-use, the distribution
of waste disposal costs between the manufacturer and the customer, design standards, and recovery/re-
use requirements, influence upstream choices of q, θ, and product price by the manufacturer, given that
the customer makes equipment replacement decisions optimally. Thus, our model is flexible enough to
treat EPR instruments such as product take-back, recovery targets, deposit/refund systems, advance
disposal fees, design standards, charges for environmental impact during product use, and any com-
bination of these.7 Since product take-back is an essential feature of most EPR programs, we assume
that the manufacturer is legally responsible for the physical take-back of the product post customer-
use. We view profit-maximization as the objective and consider two distinct supply-chain structures
- the uncoordinated case, in which the manufacturer and customer share common knowledge about q
and θ but optimize their profits separately, and the coordinated case, in which the manufacturer and
customer are one integrated firm which optimizes the sum total of the profits of the customer and the
manufacturer.
From a firm’s perspective, we present a methodology to incorporate environmental regulation and
customer replacement behavior into strategic product design decisions. From a regulatory standpoint,
the research effort addresses the impacts of environmental policy parameters on upstream environ-
mental design choices by the manufacturer. In both the uncoordinated as well as the coordinated
cases we find that the optimal level of remanufacturability increases in the cost of waste disposal as
well as in the environmental costs during product use. The optimal level of performance increases in
response to increasing waste disposal costs. When the cost of waste disposal is relatively large, it is
profitable for the firm to provide better performance in response to an increase in environmental costs
during product use. When the cost of waste disposal is relatively small, it is profitable for the firm to
sacrifice performance and save on design costs in response to an increase in environmental costs during
product use. However, a numerical exercise demonstrates that, from an environmental standpoint,
coordination in the supply chain is beneficial. Design choices in the coordinated case are environmen-
tally superior to those in the uncoordinated case. From the viewpoint of firm profitability as well, we
find that the integrated firm always secures a profit larger than the corresponding supply chain profit
in the uncoordinated case. Therefore, we suggest contracts that can help achieve coordination in the
7Although not explicitly modeled, a material tax has a net effect similar to that of a unit cost for waste disposal. The
instruments accommodated in our model are the predominant ones used in EPR programs across countries. An example
from practice of firms being subject to a combination of EPR instruments include firms in the EU subject to product
take-back legislation as well as costs for emissions through the EU greenhouse gas emissions trading program.
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supply chain because coordination results in both higher supply chain profit as well as environmentally
superior product design choices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the analysis
for the uncoordinated case where the manufacturer and customer optimize their profits separately.
Section 4 presents the analysis for the coordinated case where the manufacturer and the customer are
one integrated firm that maximizes the sum total of profits. Section 5 provides comparisons between the
results in the uncoordinated and coordinated cases through a numerical example. Section 6 discusses
coordinating contracts between the manufacturer and the customer. Section 7 concludes with insights
for firms as well as regulators and provides directions for future research.
2 The Model
A single manufacturer supplies a remanufacturable, durable good to a single customer. The customer
has a continuing need for the services of the product. The manufacturer faces the decision of choosing
optimal levels of two attributes of the product - one which determines the environmental performance
of the product during product use, and the other which determines the product’s environmental impact
post customer-use. We model a one-dimensional “more is better” measure of environmental perfor-
mance during product use q, analogous to the modeling of product performance or quality in Chen
(2001), Kornish (2001), Kim & Chhajed (2000), and Moorthy & Png (1992). The product’s reman-
ufacturability is determined by the second attribute θ. Debo et al. (2003) and Fleischmann et al.
(2001) model the choice of remanufacturability by the manufacturer as the fraction of products that
can be remanufactured after use. In an analogous manner, and similar to Fullerton & Wu (1998), we
model θ ∈ [0, 1] as the fraction of the product (say, by weight) that can be re-used, recovered, or re-
manufactured after use. As in Debo et al. (2003) and Calcott & Walls (2002), θ determines the cost of
production; the cost of production is bounded above by the cost of manufacturing a new product, and
decreases in θ. To provide a connection between the manufacturer’s optimal choices of performance
and remanufacturability, and the customer’s replacement decision, we utilize an economic-life model
to characterize the customer’s replacement decision. The economic-life model involves determining the
optimum point in time to replace equipment (Dean 1961). We use the replacement model suggested
by Clapham (1957), which determines the economic life of equipment by minimizing the average sum
of capital and (increasing) operating costs per period. Let τ denote the optimal time interval derived
using the Clapham model, between successive replacements by the customer.
A higher level of remanufacturability lowers the unit cost c of production. c is assumed to decrease
linearly in θ. Additionally, the unit cost to the manufacturer of providing performance is assumed to
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be convex increasing in q. Hence, the unit cost is given by c(q, θ), with cq > 0, cqq > 0, cθ < 0, cθθ = 0,
cqθ < 0.
8 The initial design cost to the manufacturer of providing q and θ is k(q, θ) with kq > 0, kqq > 0,
kθ > 0, kθθ > 0, and kqθ = 0. These assumptions are consistent with those in Debo et al. (2003),
Kim & Chhajed (2002), Kouvelis & Mukhopadhyay (1995), and Moorthy & Png (1992). Also, we
assume that a higher performance level translates into lower product operating costs. In other words,
u(q1) < u(q2) for q1 > q2. We denote the cost gradient
9 of the product’s environmental impact during
use (e.g., monetary charges for emissions) as e(q), and the cost for waste disposal (e.g., landfilling costs)
at the end of the product’s economic life as w(θ). We assume that eq < 0, eqq > 0. In other words,
we assume that performance (such as energy efficiency) decreases the cost of environmental impact
during product use in a convex manner. Landfilling costs are typically linear in the amount of waste
to be disposed of (for example, see EPA 1998).10 Hence, we assume that w(θ) decreases linearly in θ,
or wθ < 0, wθθ = 0. Denote α and β = 1−α as the fractions of the cost of waste disposal borne by the
customer and manufacturer respectively. EPR instruments differ in the magnitudes of e, w and α, and
possibly in the specification of lower bounds on q and θ. We explore incentives for upstream design
choices by the manufacturer for different implementations of EPR under two scenarios - when the
customer and manufacturer are separate entities and optimize their profits separately (uncoordinated
case), and when the customer and manufacturer are one integrated entity that optimizes total profit
(coordinated case).
The manufacturer’s design and price decisions impact the customer’s optimal replacement policy.
Performance and remanufacturability choices by the manufacturer, in turn, depend on the trade-offs in
terms of the relative frequencies and magnitudes of revenue or profit earning instances corresponding
to product replacements by the customer.11 The sequence of decisions is as follows. In a given EPR
scenario, the manufacturer first chooses q and θ jointly. He then chooses the price r > c to be charged
to the customer for product replacements. The customer buys the product at price r if she makes her
reservation profit from employing an optimal replacement policy, given q, θ, and r. We proceed by
backward induction according to the sequence of decisions in order to arrive at the optimal values of
8Incorporating variable costs independent of θ and q does not change the analysis or affect the nature of results.
An implicit assumption is that replacements are readily available to the customer. Since we model a single product
being remanufactured and sold in each replacement instance, incorporating fixed costs into the model will not change the
analysis or the nature of results.
9We model a linear degradation of the product’s environmental performance with respect to time (and, hence, a linear
increase in environmental costs during product use with respect to time), implicitly assuming a uniform usage pattern.
10Information on landfilling in the US is available at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/muncpl/disposal.htm.
11An implicit assumption in the model is that the customer and the manufacturer have common knowledge about q




In this section, we explore optimal design and price choices by the manufacturer when the manufacturer
and customer share common knowledge about q and θ but optimize their profits separately. Using
backward induction, we first solve for the customer’s optimal replacement policy as a function of
the manufacturer’s design and price choices. The optimal replacement policy is then fed into the
manufacturer’s optimal price decision. Finally, we deduce the manufacturer’s optimal design choices
of performance and remanufacturability, given the optimal price to be charged to the customer and
the customer’s optimal replacement policy.
3.1 Customer’s Problem
We use Clapham’s model to represent the customer’s replacement problem. Clapham’s model de-
termines the economic life of equipment by minimizing the average sum of capital and (increasing)
operating costs per period. In order to demonstrate that customer replacement behavior is not qual-
itatively specific to our choice of the replacement model, we show in Appendix B that the properties
of the optimal replacement interval in Clapham’s model are similar to those in the richer model by
Bellman (1955) which includes discounting but lacks tractability. The customer’s profit rate is given
by







(u + e)x dx − αw
t
(1)
= φ − (r + αw)
t
− (u + e)t
2
(2)
where φ is the revenue earned by the customer per period by employing the product, t is the replacement
interval, and u is the inferiority gradient or the linear rate (with respect to time) of cost increase due
to operating inferiority. The second term on the right hand side of (1) represents the capital cost per
period for the customer. Notice that environmental cost during product use is incurred in each period
whereas the cost for waste disposal is incurred when the product is replaced. The optimal time interval






The above expression is analogous to the familiar EOQ formula for choosing the optimal order
quantity, given the fixed cost of ordering, the unit cost of the product being ordered, and the inventory
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holding cost rate. The sum of the price of the product and the cost of waste disposal in our model is
analogous to the fixed ordering cost in the EOQ model. The sum of the operating costs and the costs
of environmental impact during product use per period is analogous to the holding cost rate in the
EOQ model.12 Proposition 1 provides properties of the customer’s optimal replacement interval with
respect to the replacement cost r, the operating cost gradient u, the cost of waste disposal w, and the
environmental cost gradient e.
Proposition 1



























= −12 1√2(u+e)(r+αw)3 < 0.














































Proposition 1.i implies that the optimal time interval τ between replacements increases in a concave
manner with the customer’s replacement cost r. A higher replacement cost translates into less frequent
replacements, and the frequency of replacements can be expected to be decreasingly influenced by
increasing replacement costs. Proposition 1.ii implies that τ is convex decreasing in the operating cost
gradient. Larger operating cost gradients with respect to time result in more frequent replacements and
the frequency of replacements can be expected to be decreasingly influenced by increasing operating




where D is the demand rate, S is the







. This is very similar to the expression for the optimal replacement interval in (3). In our model, one unit of
the product is ordered in each replacement instance.
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cost gradients. Propositions 1.iii and 1.iv imply that the replacement interval increases concavely in the
cost of waste disposal and in the customer’s share of the cost of waste disposal. This is intuitive since
a larger cost of waste disposal can be expected to delay replacement and this effect can be expected
to diminish as the cost of waste disposal increases. Proposition 1.v implies that τ is convex decreasing
in the environmental cost gradient. This again is intuitive because larger environmental cost increases
over time prompt more frequent replacements. Also, the frequency of replacements can be expected
to be decreasingly influenced by increasing environmental costs. Substituting τ from (3) for t in (2)
we have
ΠC = φ −
√
2(u + e)(r + αw) (4)
Without loss of generality, the participation constraint for the customer is ΠC ≥ 0, or
φ −
√
2(u + e)(r + αw) ≥ 0 (5)
Having analyzed the customer’s optimal replacement policy as a function of the manufacturer’s deci-
sions and the parameters of the model, we proceed to solve the manufacturer’s problem.
3.2 Manufacturer’s Problem
For consistency with the customer’s objective and for analytical convenience, we assume that the
manufacturer’s objective is to maximize average profit per period.13 Let T denote the planning horizon.
For instance, the planning horizon could be the duration of time for which a particular product
version or model is offered. The optimization problem for the manufacturer subject to the customer’s












We work by backward induction and evaluate the manufacturer’s optimal price decision given design
choices of q and θ. The customer’s optimal replacement interval can be plugged into (6). Proposition
2 provides a useful result.
13The problem becomes analytically intractable when discounting is considered. However, the qualitative nature of
results remains unchanged.
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Proposition 2 Given design choices of q and θ, the manufacturer’s profit increases concavely in the
price r > c charged to the customer.
Proof:
ΠM =

























The above result, though straightforward, is not obvious. This is because it is possible for the manu-
facturer to trade away the magnitude of revenue in each replacement instance for a higher frequency
of customer replacements. Corollary 1 follows directly from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 It is optimal for the manufacturer to price the product at r∗ = φ
2
2(u+e) − αw.
Proof: From Proposition 2, we have that ΠM is increasing in r. Hence it is optimal for the manufacturer
to charge as high a price as possible, subject to the participation constraint of the customer. The result
follows from setting (5) as an equality.
Thus, we have solved for the manufacturer’s optimal price and the customer’s optimal replace-
ment policy as a function of q, θ, and the parameters of the model. We now proceed to the first
stage in the sequence of decisions where the manufacturer chooses optimal values of performance and
remanufacturability.
Manufacturer’s Design Decision
We have r∗ = φ
2
2(u+e) − αw and τ =
φ
u+e . The behavior of the manufacturer’s profit function with




















































We note the following:
i. ∂c∂q > 0;
∂k
∂q > 0.



















> 0, since ∂u∂q < 0 and
∂e
∂q < 0.














∂θ = −α∂w∂θ ≥ 0 for α ≥ 0, since ∂w∂θ < 0.
vi. ∂τ∂θ = 0.
The first term on the right hand side of (7) is > 0 since ∂r
∗
∂q > 0. This term represents the
increase in profit due to a higher price which the manufacturer can charge for a superior performance
product. The second term on the right hand side of (7) is < 0 since ∂c∂q > 0. This term represents
the decrease in profit due to a higher unit cost for a superior performance product. The third term
on the right hand side of (7) is < 0 since ∂τ∂q > 0. This term represents the decrease in profit due to
less frequent replacements by the customer if the product has superior performance and, consequently,
lower operating and environmental costs. The fourth term on the right hand side of (7) is < 0 since
∂k
∂q > 0. This term represents the decrease in profit due to higher design costs for a superior performance
product. The first term on the right hand side of (8) is ≥ 0 since ∂r∗∂θ > 0 if α > 0, and ∂r
∗
∂θ = 0 if
α = 0. When the customer incurs a non-zero fraction of the cost of waste disposal, a greater level
of remanufacturability reduces this cost and enables the customer to afford a higher product price,
thereby contributing positively to manufacturer profit. The second term on the right hand side of (8)
is > 0 since ∂c∂θ < 0. This term represents the increase in profit due to lower production cost for a
product with greater remanufacturability. The third term on the right hand side of (8) is > 0 since
∂w
∂θ < 0. This term represents the increase in profit due to a decrease in waste disposal costs from a
greater level of remanufacturability. The fourth term on the right hand side of (8) is = 0 since ∂τ∂θ = 0.
The optimal replacement interval is unaffected by the remanufacturability level. This seems surprising
because the expression for the optimal replacement interval in (3) includes a term in w which depends
on θ. However, this term vanishes when the optimal price r∗ is substituted for r in (3). Note that
r∗ = φ
2
2(u+e) − αw. Therefore, r∗ + αw is independent of θ. In other words, any benefit of lower
waste disposal costs14 to the customer from greater product remanufacturability is extracted back by
the manufacturer via a higher product price with the net result being that the optimal replacement
interval is independent of product remanufacturability. The fifth term on the right hand side of (8) is
< 0 since ∂k∂θ > 0. This term represents the decrease in profit due to higher design costs for a product
with greater remanufacturability.
While we are able to individually describe the factors influencing manufacturer profit, we now
14Recall that the customer’s share of waste disposal costs is αw.
13
require functional forms for k, c, u, e, and w in order to facilitate exposition and provide collective
insights into the problem. We assume that the fixed cost of design is separable in q and θ and is of
the form k := k1q
2 + k2θ
2. We assume that the cost of production is c := c0q
2(1 − θ). Thus, the
cost of production decreases linearly in the remanufacturability of the product and is bounded above
by the cost c0q
2 of manufacturing a new product. We assume u := u0q . Thus, u decreases convexly
in q but does not depend on θ. Other possibilities exist for the customer’s operating cost gradient
u and the customer’s revenue φ. u could possibly depend on θ if there is a perceived increase in
operating inferiority from using a remanufactured product which feeds into the customer’s optimal
replacement decision. Also, we assume that φ is constant in each period, independent of q. The case
when the customer’s revenue is independent of the performance level q is apt in situations where q
impacts operating costs but not revenue. An example is when q represents energy efficiency. Examples
where φ would increase in q include situations where q impacts equipment uptime or a feature like
torque. A higher value of q would then imply that the customer can earn larger revenues for the same
duration of product usage. Combinations of different functional assumptions yield various scenarios.
However, we focus on the assumed functional forms. We assume w to be of the form w0(1 − θ),
implying that the cost of waste disposal decreases linearly in the amount of waste disposed. Finally,
we assume e := e0q . Thus, the cost of environmental impact during product use decreases convexly in
performance. With these functional forms, we now look at optimal design choices by the manufacturer.
In the first stage of the sequence of decisions, the manufacturer optimizes his profit with respect to q
and θ, given the optimal price to be charged for the product and the customer’s optimal replacement
policy. Substituting r∗ = φ
2
2(u+e) − αw (from Corollary 1) and τ =
φ
u+e into the manufacturer’s profit
function in (6), we have
ΠM =





Proposition 3 provides properties of the manufacturer’s profit function with respect to q, θ, and
the parameters of the model.
Proposition 3







, and denote q∗ = q : ∂ΠM∂q = 0, θ
∗ = θ :
∂ΠM
∂θ = 0. The manufacturer’s profit function is jointly concave in q and θ, and, hence, (q
∗, θ∗)
uniquely maximizes ΠM .
15
15The reader should bear in mind that in the presence of design standards, q or/and θ would be bounded below by
the standard(s). For expositional convenience, we do not incorporate possible design standards into the expressions for
q and θ. We also ignore the rather obvious effects of design standards in subsequent analysis.
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= −2k2T < 0.
The determinant of the Hessian matrix of ΠM (q, θ) =
−(u0+e0)2(c0q2−w0)2T 2+4k2φ(u0+e0)w0q(1−θ)T+4k1k2φ2q4
φ2q4T 2
> 0 if k2 >
(u0+e0)(c0q2−w0)2T
4w0φq(1−θ) . Thus, with the assumption on k2, the Hessian matrix of ΠM with
respect to q and θ is negative definite, yielding the result.










































Note that σ > 0 and q∗ > 0. Also, 0 < θ∗ < 1 since k2 >
(u0+e0)(c0q2+w0)T
2φq by assumption. Thus,
the only assumption needed for the manufacturer’s profit to be jointly concave in q and θ is that
the coefficient of the design cost of remanufacturability be sufficiently large - which is a reasonable
assumption. An interesting observation is that the optimal values of q and θ do not depend upon
the distribution of the waste disposal cost between the manufacturer and the customer. This has to
do with optimal product price r∗ = φ
2
2(u+e) − αw charged by the manufacturer. The manufacturer
extracts any decrease in the customer’s share of the waste disposal cost by charging a higher product
price. Proposition 3.ii states that the manufacturer’s profit decreases in the cost of waste disposal.
This is because of two effects. A larger cost of waste disposal decreases the price which the manu-
facturer can charge to the customer and also increases the manufacturer’s share of the waste disposal
15
cost. Proposition 3.iii states that the manufacturer’s profit decreases in the environmental costs to the
customer during product use. This, again, is because a larger environmental cost depresses the price
which the manufacturer can charge to the customer. From Proposition 3.iv we have that the manu-
facturer’s profit increases in the customer’s revenue per period from the use of the product. A larger
customer revenue from product use enables the manufacturer to charge a higher product price. This
alludes to a possible benefit to the manufacturer in sharing effort to help increase customer revenue.
Proposition 4 describes the behaviors of the optimal performance and remanufacturability levels for


























< 0 if w0 < c0q







< 0 if w0 < c0q
∗2, and > 0
if w0 > c0q
∗2; ∂q
∗
∂φ > 0 if w0 < c0q





































ii. Denote f1 :=
∂ΠM
∂q . q
∗ satisfies ∂ΠM∂q = 0; i.e., f1(q






. Since ΠM is concave in q, (∂f1/∂q














2[(u0+e0)(1−θ)w0T+k1φq∗3] < 0 if w0 < c0q











2[(u0+e0)(1−θ)w0T+k1φq∗3] < 0 if w0 < c0q






2φ[(u0+e0)(1−θ)w0T+k1φq∗3] > 0 if w0 < c0q






Note that r∗ = φ
2
2(u+e) −αw. θ∗ increases in w0 because of two effects. A larger waste disposal cost
reduces the price which the manufacturer can charge to the customer for the product and also increases
the waste disposal cost incurred by the manufacturer. A larger remanufacturability level reverses these
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effects. As the coefficient c0 increases, θ
∗ increases in order to lower the cost of production. Similarly,
q∗ decreases as c0 increases, in order to keep the cost of production low. Both θ∗ and q∗ decrease in
the cost of design. This is intuitive since larger design costs should result in lower optimal choices of
θ∗ and q∗. θ∗ increases in e0 and u0 in order to decrease waste disposal costs and, hence, increase
the price that can be charged for the product. θ∗ decreases in φ because a larger customer revenue
per period increases the price that can be charged by the manufacturer and diminishes the incentive
for the manufacturer to reduce waste disposal costs by providing greater remanufacturability. As w0
increases, q∗ increases in order to decrease u and e and, hence, increase manufacturer revenue from
the sale of the product. Note that the customer’s optimal replacement interval is τ = φ(u+e) . There is
an important difference in the manner in which q and θ impact the manufacturer’s total revenue over
the planning horizon. While r∗ increases in both q as well as θ, τ increases in q but is unaffected by
θ. Thus, an increase in θ always increases the manufacturer’s total revenue over the planning horizon
whereas the impact of a change in q on the manufacturer’s total revenue over the planning horizon
is more intricate. When the cost of waste disposal is relatively high, r∗ is relatively low and it is
profitable for the manufacturer to increase q and, hence, increase r∗. Thus, q∗ increases in e0 and u0,
and decreases in φ when w0 is relatively large. These incentives are reversed when w0 is relatively
small because when w0 is small, an increase in q increases the replacement interval τ but does not
significantly increase r∗.
We now proceed to analyze the coordinated case. Sections 3 and 4 are supplemented by a numerical
example in Section 5, in which comparisons between the outcomes in the two cases are made and
insights for firms as well as regulators are provided.
4 Coordinated Case
In this section, we determine the optimal replacement policy and design choices for the integrated firm
which optimizes the sum total of the profits of the customer and the manufacturer. Using backward
induction, we first solve for the integrated firm’s optimal replacement policy as a function of its design
choices. Note that since the firm is integrated, the price decision is absent. We then deduce the firm’s
optimal design choices of performance and remanufacturability, given the optimal replacement policy.
4.1 Replacement Decision
Since the manufacturer and customer are one integrated entity, the replacement decision is to choose an
optimal replacement time interval that maximizes the sum total of the customer’s and manufacturer’s
17
profits, given design choices of q and θ. Thus, the integrated firm chooses t which maximizes Π, where
Π is given by
Π := ΠC + ΠM =
[
φ − r + αw
t













= φ− (c + w)
t











A comparison of (13) and (3) shows that the integrated firm’s effective unit cost, i.e., the sum of
production cost and the cost of waste disposal affects the replacement interval in the coordinated
case, while in the uncoordinated case, the replacement interval depends upon the customer’s effective
unit cost, i.e., the sum of the price charged by manufacturer and the customer’s share of the waste
disposal cost. Proposition 5 provides properties of the optimal replacement interval with respect to the
production cost c, the operating cost gradient u, the cost of waste disposal w, and the environmental
cost gradient e.
Proposition 5























= −12 1√2(u+e)(c+w)3 < 0.



































Explanations for the above behaviors are similar to those provided for Proposition 1 mutatis mu-
tandis. Having solved for the integrated firm’s optimal replacement policy, we proceed to the first




The behavior of the integrated firm’s profit function with respect to its design choices of q and θ can




























































We note the following:















































The first term on the right hand side of (14) is < 0 since ∂c∂q > 0. This term represents the decrease
in profit due to a higher unit cost for a superior performance product. The second term on the right






= 0, although ∂τi∂q > 0. The replacement interval increases
in performance because of higher production cost, lower operating costs, and lower environmental costs
during product use. However, this effect vanishes because the replacement interval is optimally chosen
such that the marginal benefit of decreased operating, environmental, and waste disposal costs from
better performance and remanufacturability equates the marginal cost of production. The third term
on the right hand side of (14) is > 0 since ∂u∂q < 0. This term represents the increase in profit due to
lower operating costs for a superior performance product. The fourth term on the right hand side of
(14) is > 0 since ∂e∂q < 0. This term represents the increase in profit due to lower environmental costs for
a superior performance product. The fifth term on the right hand side of (14) is < 0 since ∂k∂q > 0. This
term represents the decrease in profit due to larger design costs for a superior performance product.
The first term on the right hand side of (15) is > 0 since ∂w∂θ < 0. This term represents the increase in
profit due to a decrease in waste disposal cost with greater remanufacturability. The second term on
the right hand side of (15) is > 0 since ∂c∂θ < 0. This term represents the increase in profit due to lower
production cost for a product with greater remanufacturability. The third term on the right hand
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= 0, although ∂τi∂θ < 0. The replacement interval decreases in
remanufacturability because of lower production and waste disposal costs. However, this effect vanishes
again because the replacement interval is optimally chosen such that the marginal benefit of decreased
operating, environmental, and waste disposal costs from better performance and remanufacturability
equates the marginal cost of production. The fourth term on the right hand side of (15) is < 0 since
∂k
∂θ > 0. This term represents the decrease in profit due to larger design costs for a product with greater
remanufacturability. Substituting the optimal replacement interval from (13) for t in the integrated
firm’s profit function in (12), we have
Π = φ −
√
2(c + w)(u + e) − k
T
(16)
Proposition 6 provides properties of the integrated firm’s profit function with respect to q, θ, and the
parameters of the model. We use the same functional forms as those assumed in Section 3.
Proposition 6
























, and denote q∗i = q :
∂Π





θ : ∂Π∂θ = 0, 0
}
. The integrated firm’s profit function is jointly concave in q and θ, and,
hence, (q∗i , θ
∗
i ) uniquely maximizes Π.

















































































8q(1−θ)3 . Note that the lower bound on θ is 0. With the assumptions on k1
and k2, the Hessian matrix of Π with respect to q and θ is negative definite, yielding the result.
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The optimal values of qi and θi can be derived from the first order conditions
∂Π
∂q = 0 and
∂Π
∂θ = 0.
Thus, we have that q∗i satisfies
8k21q
5(c0q
2 + w0) − u0T 2(c0q2 − w0)2(1 − θ) = 0 (17)
And θ∗i (if > 0) satisfies





Note that q∗i > 0. The left hand side of equation (18) is a polynomial (cubic) function of odd degree
with real coefficients. Hence, it has at least one real root. Using Descartes’ Rule of Signs we have
that the above cubic function has one negative root and either two positive real roots or two complex
conjugate roots. We require θ∗i to be a non-negative fraction less than or equal to one. In order
that the cubic equation have one negative and two positive roots, we require that the discriminant









32q ensures that 27ξ
2 − 4ξ < 0 and, hence, that the cubic equation has
one negative and two positive roots. θ ≥ 1 cannot satisfy θ3 − θ2 + ξ = 0. Hence θ∗i > 0 implies that
θ∗i < 1. In the coordinated case, the assumptions needed for the integrated firm’s profit to be jointly
concave in q and θ are that the coefficients of the design costs of performance and remanufacturability
be sufficiently large. These are reasonable assumptions. Propositions 6.ii and 6.iii show that the
integrated firm’s profit decreases convexly in w0 and e0. In contrast to the linear decrease of supply
chain profit with respect to w0 and e0 in the uncoordinated case, the integrated firm’s profit in the
coordinated case is decreasingly affected by increasing costs of waste disposal and environmental costs
during product use. Thus, the effects of increasing environmental costs on firm profits are felt more
strongly in the uncoordinated case than in the coordinated case. In addition, Proposition 6.iv shows
that the integrated firm’s profit increases linearly with per-period revenue φ, in contrast to the concave
increase in supply chain profit with respect to φ in the uncoordinated case. Proposition 7 describes
the behaviors of the optimal performance and remanufacturability levels for the coordinated case, with
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∗
i
2, and > 0
















∂θ = 0; i.e., f2(θ
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. Since Π is concave in θ, (∂f2/∂θ
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∂q = 0; i.e., f3(q
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. Since Π is concave in q, (∂f3/∂q
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The behavior of the optimal remanufacturability level θ∗i and the optimal performance level q
∗
i with
respect to c0, k1 and k2 is intuitive and the explanation for the behavior is similar to that provided
for Proposition 4 in Section 3. θ∗i increases in w0 in order to lower the cost of waste disposal. From
our earlier discussion, we have that ∂τi∂θ < 0, and
∂τi
∂q > 0. Any increase in θ increases the frequency of
replacements by the firm. Thus, the response to either increasing operating costs (i.e., u0) or increasing
environmental costs during product use (i.e., e0) is an increase in the frequency of replacements through
greater remanufacturability. The response to increasing waste disposal costs (i.e., w0) is a decrease in
the frequency of replacements through better performance. When w0 is relatively large, it is profitable
for the firm to provide better performance and decrease the frequency of replacements in response to an
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increase in u0 or e0. However, when w0 is relatively small, the replacement frequency is correspondingly
large, and it is beneficial to sacrifice performance and save on design costs. Hence, when w0 is relatively
small, q∗i decreases in u0 and e0. The integrated firm’s revenues from product use are independent of
design choices, and these revenues contribute entirely to the integrated firm’s profit. This is in contrast
to the uncoordinated case where the customer’s revenue from product use, together with q, θ, and r,
governs the revenue earned by the manufacturer through the sale of the product to the customer. We
provide additional insights into the results in the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with the help
of a numerical example in Section 5.
5 Numerical Example
Tables 1 and 2 provide numerical illustrations of the results in the uncoordinated and coordinated cases
and facilitate comparisons between the two cases. Note that the values for φ, e∗, u∗, Π∗M + Π
∗
C , and
Π∗ are per-period amounts whereas the values for w∗ and r∗ are amounts per replacement instance.
As seen in Tables 1 and 2, the optimal reaction to increasing w0 is, for the manufacturer in the
uncoordinated case and the integrated firm in the coordinated case, to provide greater performance
as well as remanufacturability. The numerical illustrations for the two cases are set up with w0 being
relatively large (see Propositions 4 and 7). Hence, in both cases we have that the optimal response
to increasing e0 is, for the manufacturer in the uncoordinated case and the integrated firm in the
coordinated case, to provide greater performance and remanufacturability. From Table 1, we see
that with w0 = 400 and e0 = 20, when the customer’s revenue per period increases from 1500 to
2500, the manufacturer can charge a price which is 160.51% higher. However, the incentives for the
manufacturer to provide performance and remanufacturability decrease when the customer’s per-period
revenue increases. From Table 1, we see that when w0 = 400 and e0 = 20, the drop in performance
is 11.22% and the drop in remanufacturability is 36.22% when the customer’s per-period revenue
increases from 1500 to 2500. In the coordinated case, design choices are unaffected by the integrated
firm’s revenue. As seen in Table 2, design choices remain exactly the same despite revenue per-period
increasing from 1500 to 2500.
Recall that in the uncoordinated case, the customer’s profit is set to 0 without loss of generality.
Hence, the total supply chain profit is equal to the manufacturer’s profit. Notice that supply chain
profit in both the uncoordinated and the coordinated cases decreases with increasing waste disposal
costs (i.e., increasing w0) or increasing environmental costs during product use (i.e., increasing e0).
For the uncoordinated case in Table 1, the 1000 unit increase in customer revenue from 1500 to 2500
per period results in a correspondingly smaller increase in supply chain profit in absolute terms; for
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Table 1: Numerical Illustration: Uncoordinated Case∗
Scenario w0 w




Increasing w0 200 186.18 20 152.73 572.74 0.1309 0.0691 2.07 590.86 1457.63
φ = 1500 400 359.37 20 118.04 442.65 0.1694 0.1016 2.68 514.09 1826.78
600 523.19 20 102.11 382.92 0.1959 0.1280 3.09 452.81 2057.87
Increasing w0 200 191.28 20 171.15 641.81 0.1169 0.0436 3.08 1144.18 3748.32
φ = 2500 400 374.07 20 133.02 498.81 0.1504 0.0648 3.96 1090.63 4758.95
600 550.69 20 115.26 432.21 0.1735 0.0822 4.57 1047.22 5432.75
Increasing e0 400 363.21 10 60.49 453.70 0.1653 0.0920 2.92 533.51 2006.27
φ = 1500 400 359.37 20 118.04 442.65 0.1694 0.1016 2.68 514.09 1826.78
400 355.53 30 173.29 433.24 0.1731 0.1112 2.47 495.07 1677.04
Increasing e0 400 376.43 10 68.39 512.93 0.1462 0.0589 4.30 1103.53 5187.43
φ = 2500 400 374.07 20 133.02 498.81 0.1504 0.0648 3.96 1090.63 4758.95
400 371.72 30 194.68 486.70 0.1541 0.0707 3.67 1078.00 4400.44
∗c0 = 5000, u0 = 75, k1 = 75000, k2 = 50000, α = β = 0.5, T = 50.
example, when w0 = 400 and e0 = 20, this increase in supply chain profit is 576.54. In contrast, for the
coordinated case in Table 2, any increase in revenue from product use results in an identical increase
in supply chain profit. In addition, the integrated firm’s profit in the coordinated case always exceeds
the corresponding supply chain profit in the uncoordinated case. The loss to the supply chain from a
lack of coordination can be attributed to a close analog of the classic double marginalization problem
in a decentralized bilateral monopoly (Spengler 1950). In the uncoordinated case, the manufacturer
prices the product above cost and this price determines the customer’s product replacement frequency.
The optimal replacement interval in the uncoordinated case is given by
√
2(r+αw)
u+e , whereas that in
the coordinated case is given by
√
2(c+w)
u+e , where r > c. The net effect of optimal design choices on
product replacement frequency is that the customer in the uncoordinated case replaces the product
less frequently than the integrated firm in the coordinated case. Also, in the uncoordinated case,
r∗ = φ
2
2(u+e) −αw and τ =
φ
u+e . Therefore, the average revenue per period earned by the manufacturer




φ , implying that customer revenue from
product use does not entirely translate into net supply chain revenue (i.e., r
∗
τ < φ), and also that any
increase in the customer’s per-period revenue from product use results in a smaller increase in total
supply chain profit.
The monetary impact of the lack of coordination decreases as the cost of waste disposal increases
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Table 2: Numerical Illustration: Coordinated Case∗
Scenario w0 w




Increasing w0 200 165.57 20 129.33 484.99 0.1546 0.1722 0.93 864.37
φ = 1500 400 314.66 20 101.53 380.75 0.1970 0.2134 1.39 724.93
600 453.46 20 89.15 334.30 0.2243 0.2442 1.74 626.54
Increasing w0 200 165.57 20 129.33 484.99 0.1546 0.1722 0.93 1864.37
φ = 2500 400 314.66 20 101.53 380.75 0.1970 0.2134 1.39 1724.93
600 453.46 20 89.15 334.30 0.2243 0.2442 1.74 1626.54
Increasing e0 400 319.79 10 51.29 384.64 0.1950 0.2006 1.47 761.42
φ = 1500 400 314.66 20 101.53 380.75 0.1970 0.2134 1.39 724.93
400 309.70 30 150.95 377.38 0.1987 0.2258 1.32 690.64
Increasing e0 400 319.79 10 51.29 384.64 0.1950 0.2006 1.47 1761.42
φ = 2500 400 314.66 20 101.53 380.75 0.1970 0.2134 1.39 1724.93
400 309.70 30 150.95 377.38 0.1987 0.2258 1.32 1690.64
∗c0 = 5000, u0 = 75, k1 = 75000, k2 = 50000, α = β = 0.5, T = 50.
(i.e., as w0 increases). The increase in supply chain profit as a result of coordination is 46.29%
when φ = 1500, w0 = 200 and e0 = 20, but is 38.37% when φ = 1500, w0 = 600 and e0 = 20.
The corresponding increases are 62.94% and 55.32% when φ = 2500. In addition, in Table 1, when
w0 = 200 and e0 = 20, the increase in supply chain profit in absolute terms when customer revenue per
period increases from 1500 to 2500, is 553.32 whereas the increase in supply chain profit is 594.41 when
w0 = 600 and e0 = 20. The monetary impact of the lack of coordination decreases in the environmental
cost during product use (i.e., in e0) too. The increase in supply chain profit as a result of coordination
is 42.72% when φ = 1500, w0 = 400 and e0 = 10, and is 39.50% when φ = 1500, w0 = 400 and e0 = 30.
The corresponding increases are 59.62% and 56.83% when φ = 2500. In addition, in Table 1, when
w0 = 400 and e0 = 10, the increase in supply chain profit when customer revenue per period increases
from 1500 to 2500, is 570.02 whereas the increase in supply chain profit is 582.93 when w0 = 400 and
e0 = 30.
An important point to note is that optimal design choices in the coordinated case are always
more environmentally favorable than the corresponding optimal design choices in the uncoordinated
case. The divergence between the optimal design choices in the two cases decreases as either w0 or
e0 increases. When φ = 1500, w0 = 200, e0 = 20, the optimal performance level in the coordinated
case is 18.11% higher than that in the uncoordinated case. The difference is 14.50% when φ =
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1500, w0 = 600, e0 = 20. Corresponding differences are 32.25% and 29.28% when φ = 2500. When
φ = 1500, w0 = 400, e0 = 10, the optimal performance level in the coordinated case is 17.97% higher
than that in the uncoordinated case. The difference is 14.79% when φ = 1500, w0 = 400, e0 = 30.
Corresponding differences are 33.38% and 28.94% when φ = 2500. Likewise, when φ = 1500, w0 =
200, e0 = 20, the optimal remanufacturability level in the coordinated case is 149.20% higher than that
in the uncoordinated case. The difference is 90.78% when φ = 1500, w0 = 600, e0 = 20. Corresponding
differences are 294.95% and 197.08% when φ = 2500. When φ = 1500, w0 = 400, e0 = 10, the optimal
remanufacturability level in the coordinated case is 118.04% higher than that in the uncoordinated
case. The difference is 103.06% when φ = 1500, w0 = 400, e0 = 30. Corresponding differences are
240.58% and 219.38% when φ = 2500. The differences in the optimal performance levels and in
the optimal remanufacturability levels between the uncoordinated and coordinated cases widen as φ
increases. This is because optimal design choices are invariant with respect to per-period revenue in
the coordinated case, in contrast to the uncoordinated case where design choices become increasingly
environmentally unfavorable with increase in per-period customer revenue.
Thus, from an environmental standpoint, coordination in the supply chain is beneficial. Design
choices in the coordinated case are environmentally superior to those in the uncoordinated case. From
the viewpoint of firm profitability as well, we see that the integrated firm always secures a profit larger
than the corresponding supply chain profit in the uncoordinated case. Therefore, in Section 6, we
discuss contracts that can help achieve coordination in the supply chain since coordination results in
both higher supply chain profit as well as environmentally superior product design choices.
6 A Coordinating Contract
We present a contract between the manufacturer and the customer in the uncoordinated case, which
achieves the higher supply chain profit as well as the environmentally superior product design of the
coordinated case. In the uncoordinated case in Section 3, the distribution of waste disposal costs
between the manufacturer and the customer has no impact on the manufacturer’s profitability nor
does it affect upstream design choices by the manufacturer. It also turns out that different allocations
of responsibilities for operating costs and environmental costs during product use do not have a net
impact on the manufacturer’s profitability and design choices. However, the assignment of respon-
sibility for the replacement interval decision does materially affect design and profit outcomes. We
suggest a coordinating contract wherein either the customer or the manufacturer bears the operating
and environmental costs during product use while the manufacturer assumes responsibility for the
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replacement interval decision.16 The contract reflects the general concepts of leasing and installed
base management. Installed base management is an arrangement in which the manufacturer bundles
maintenance services along with the sale or lease of its product to the customer. Bhattacharya et
al. (2005) provide an excellent discussion of the literature on leasing and installed base management.
They compare the policy of selling a product to that of installed base management under different time
horizons, under stable and improving technologies for product servicing, under competition, and when
remanufacturing is possible across product generations. They find that if the remanufacturing option
is considered, installed base management does better than selling. They also provide examples from
practice and qualitatively justify the use of leasing and installed base management. However, to the
best of our knowledge, the existing literature has not studied the impact or potential influence of such
arrangements on product design, nor have such arrangements been evaluated in a regulatory context
such as EPR. A major contribution of our paper lies in demonstrating that, under EPR legislation,
coordination in the supply chain through such arrangements can lead to higher supply chain profits
and environmentally superior product designs. An important point to note is that the analysis in this
section applies quite generally, without the need to assume specific functional forms for k, c, u, e, and
w.
6.1 Analysis of the Coordinating Contract
The sequence of decisions as per the suggested contract is as follows. The manufacturer first chooses
q and θ jointly. He then chooses the replacement interval t for the product followed by the price r > c
to be charged to the customer for product replacements. The customer buys replacements at price r
if she makes her reservation profit given q, θ, t and r. The customer’s profit rate is given by
ΠC = φ −
(r + αw)
t
− δ (u + e)t
2
(19)
where t is the replacement interval chosen by the manufacturer. δ = 1 if the operating and environ-
mental costs during product use are borne by the customer, and δ = 0 if the manufacturer bears these
costs. Without loss of generality, the participation constraint for the customer is ΠC ≥ 0, or


















16Note, however, that the contract can coordinate the supply chain for any distribution of operating and/or environ-
mental costs during product use between the manufacturer and the customer.
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Given design choices of q and θ, and the replacement interval t, the manufacturer’s profit increases in
the price r > c which he charges to the customer. Hence, it is optimal for the manufacturer to price
the product at r∗ = φt − αw − δ (u+e)t
2
2 . Substituting r
∗ for r in the manufacturer’s profit function in
(21), we have
ΠM = φ −
(c + w)
t





ΠM is concave in t. Hence, τ :=
√
2(c+w)
u+e = t :
∂ΠM
∂t = 0 uniquely maximizes ΠM . Substituting τ for t
in (22), we have
ΠM = φ −
√
2(c + w)(u + e) − k
T
(23)
which is identical to the integrated firm’s profit function in (16) that is optimized with respect to q
and θ. In the first stage of the sequence of decisions under the contract, the manufacturer optimizes
his profit in (23) with respect to q and θ. This implies that the resulting optimal values of q and θ
are identical to those in the coordinated case. Note that the customer’s profit is set to 0 without loss
of generality. Hence, a contract in which either the customer or the manufacturer bears the operating
and environmental costs during product use while the manufacturer assumes responsibility for the
replacement interval decision, achieves the higher supply chain profit as well as the environmentally
superior product design of the coordinated case.
An equivalent contract is one in which the manufacturer, instead of charging r per product replace-
ment, charges a fee of f per period to the customer for the use of the product. This is similar to a
typical leasing contract for a durable product which specifies a product usage fee per period as well
as the duration of the lease. In our model, we assume uniform product usage by the customer over
time. Hence, the time duration of product use corresponds to actual product usage. The participation
constraint for the customer is φ − f − αwt − δ
(u+e)t
2 ≥ 0. The manufacturer’s profit ΠM increases in
f and, hence, he chooses f∗ = φ − αwt − δ
(u+e)t
2 . Substituting f
∗ for f into the manufacturer’s profit
function yields τ =
√
2(c+w)
u+e and a supply chain profit identical to the integrated firm’s profit in (16).
6.2 Other Contracts
For completeness, we also examine the following contracts:
a. Leasing contract which specifies a menu comprising combinations of product usage fees per period
and corresponding replacement intervals.
b. Contract which specifies a menu comprising combinations of product replacement prices and
corresponding fees or penalties that depend upon the duration of product usage.
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6.2.1 Menu of Per-Period Fees and Replacement Intervals
The contract discussed here is representative of leasing contracts for durable products which specify
usage fees per period depending upon the duration of the lease. We investigate optimal design choices
and supply chain profit in the contract wherein the customer bears the operating and environmental
costs during product use while the manufacturer specifies a menu of combinations of per-period product
usage fees and corresponding, required replacement intervals. The sequence of decisions is as follows.
The manufacturer first chooses q and θ jointly. He then chooses the menu {f, tf} of per-period product
usage fees and corresponding replacement intervals. The customer pays a usage fee from the menu and
replaces the product at the corresponding replacement interval if she makes an optimal profit given q,
θ, and {f, tf}. The customer’s profit rate is given by
ΠC = φ − f −
αw
tf
− (u + e)tf
2
(24)
where f is the per-period fee charged by the manufacturer and tf is the corresponding replacement
interval required by the manufacturer. The optimization problem for the manufacturer (in the absence
of a customer participation constraint) is
max
q,θ,{f,tf}








In order that the resulting design choices of q and θ be identical to those in the coordinated case, we
require that the manufacturer’s profit function being maximized with respect to q and θ be identical
to the integrated firm’s profit function in (16). Thus, the design-coordinating combinations of the





f − φ +
√
2(c + w)(u + e)
}
(26)
We require f > φ −
√
2(c + w)(u + e) in order that τf > 0. In equating the manufacturer’s profit
to the integrated firm’s profit, the customer ends up with a non-positive profit. The customer makes
zero profit and is indifferent between participating in the contract and staying out of it if and only if
f = φ− αwtf −
(u+e)tf
2 , or, in other words, if f and τf are identical to f
∗ and τ in Section 6.1, in which
case the contract coordinates design choices and supply chain profit.
6.2.2 Menu of Replacement Prices and Usage Penalties
In this contract, the customer bears the operating and environmental costs during product use and is
responsible for the replacement decision. The manufacturer charges a price for product replacements
as well as a penalty corresponding to the duration of product usage in order to induce a replacement
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interval identical to that in the integrated case. The sequence of decisions is as follows. The man-
ufacturer first chooses q and θ jointly. He then chooses the menu {r, ξr} of replacement prices and
corresponding usage penalties. The penalty charged to the customer is ξrt
2, where t is the customer’s
replacement interval.17 The customer replaces the product at price r and pays the corresponding usage
penalty if she makes an optimal profit from employing a replacement policy given q, θ, and {r, ξr}.
The customer’s profit rate is given by







where r is the replacement price charged by the manufacturer and ξrt
2 is the corresponding usage
penalty. Therefore, the combinations of r and ξr which induce the customer to replace the product at



















And the total supply chain profit is given by
ΠM + ΠC = φ −
(c + w)
τi





which is identical to the integrated firm’s profit in (16) when τi =
√
2(c+w)
u+e is substituted in (30).
However, the contract does not generally coordinate supply chain profit or design choices because the
profit function in (29), which the manufacturer optimizes with respect to q and θ, is different from the
profit function in (16) optimized by the integrated firm. In order for the contract to coordinate supply
chain profit and design, ΠM in (29) should equal Π in (16). In other words, we require that
r + ξ∗rτ
2




The conditions in (28) and (31) together with the customer’s optimal replacement interval τi =
√
2(c+w)
u+e , yield the following combination of r and ξr that coordinates both supply chain profit as
well as design choices:




− αw , φ
2τi




Table 3 summarizes the contracts examined in Section 6.
17Other functional forms of the penalty can easily be treated.
18As a special case, note that ξr = 0 when r = c+βw. In other words, when r is set to c+βw without a penalty being
charged, the customer’s optimal replacement interval is identical to the replacement interval τi in the coordinated case.
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Table 3: Summary of Contracts Examined
Contract type Replacement Operating costs Generally
decision by borne by coordinates
Coordinating contract - replacement price/per-period fee Manufacturer Either Profit, Design
Menu {f, tf} of per-period fees and replacement intervals Customer∗ Customer Design†
Menu {r, ξr} of replacement prices and usage penalties Customer Customer Neither‡
∗The customer chooses a fee and the corresponding replacement interval from the menu; †Coordinates supply
chain profit and design for a specific combination of f and tf ;
‡Coordinates both supply chain profit and design
for a specific combination of r and ξr.
7 Discussion and Future Work
EPR is designed to confront manufacturers with the environmental costs of the products they produce.
The principal rationale behind EPR is that manufacturers have the capacity to effect changes at the
design stage in order to reduce the life-cycle environmental impacts of products. While it is empirically
evident that manufacturers have responded to EPR legislation by taking preventive upstream measures
such as environmentally favorable product design (Tojo 2004), to the best of our knowledge, ours is the
first effort to analytically establish how various implementations of EPR influence upstream actions
by a manufacturer producing and selling a remanufacturable product.
In both the coordinated and the uncoordinated cases we find that the optimal level of remanufac-
turability increases in the cost of waste disposal as well as in the environmental costs during product
use. The optimal level of performance increases in response to increasing waste disposal costs. When
the cost of waste disposal is relatively large, it is profitable for the firm to provide better performance
in response to an increase in environmental costs during product use. When the cost of waste disposal
is relatively small, it is profitable for the firm to sacrifice performance and save on design costs in
response to an increase in environmental costs during product use. However, the numerical exercise
demonstrates that, from an environmental standpoint, coordination in the supply chain is beneficial.
Design choices in the coordinated case are environmentally superior to those in the uncoordinated
case. From the viewpoint of firm profitability as well, we find that the integrated firm always secures
a profit larger than the corresponding supply chain profit in the uncoordinated case. The contracts
presented in Section 6 can help achieve coordination in the supply chain.
Our results provide insights to firms subject to or anticipating EPR legislation, as well as to
regulators implementing or contemplating EPR legislation. From a firm’s perspective, we present a
methodology to incorporate environmental regulation and customer replacement behavior into strate-
gic product design decisions. From a regulatory standpoint, the research effort addresses the impacts
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of environmental policy parameters on upstream environmental design choices by the manufacturer.
Increasing environmental costs do not always induce desirable design outcomes. For example, the
response to increasing environmental costs during product use when the cost of waste disposal is rel-
atively small, is for the manufacturer to decrease the performance level in the product. However,
remanufacturability is always influenced in an environmentally favorable manner with increasing envi-
ronmental costs. Any increase in waste disposal costs achieves reduction in waste by inducing a higher
level of remanufacturability that increases recovery after product use, as well as a higher level of per-
formance that decreases the frequency of equipment replacement. The distribution of waste disposal
costs between the manufacturer and the customer has no net impact on design outcomes. We also
find that it could be optimal for the manufacturer to go beyond mandated design standards, if any. In
order for design standards to have bite, it is important for the regulator to understand what the firm
would optimally do in the absence of design standards. Thus, the impacts that EPR instruments have
on design outcomes are intricate and not obvious. Coordination in the supply chain better meets the
profitability objective of the firm as well as the environmental design goals of the regulator. In addition,
the negative impacts of increasing environmental costs on profitability are felt more strongly in the
uncoordinated case than in the coordinated case. The seemingly divergent objectives of profitability
and environmental benevolence can be harmonized through the coordinating contracts described in
Section 6. An important point to note is that these contracts are very generally applicable, irrespective
of the specific functional forms assumed for the purpose of analysis. The suggested contracts reflect
the general concepts of leasing and installed base management.
Several extensions to this work merit treatment in future research, though we believe that our basic
qualitative insights would largely continue to hold. In assuming that remanufacturing is profitable
to the manufacturer and is also preferred by the knowledgable customer, we abstracted from the
cannibalization effect that remanufactured products have on the sales of new products. Also, we
assumed that a single manufacturer sells to a single customer. The effects of considering multiple
customers and heterogeneous preferences with regard to new and remanufactured products are worth
evaluating. In addition, competition between manufacturers for customer demand can change upstream
outcomes in interesting ways in the presence of customers’ switching costs. Information asymmetry
between the manufacturer and the customer with regard to the manufacturer’s production costs and
the customer’s operating costs could be studied within the context of our model. Uncertainty could
be incorporated into the model in different ways. There could be uncertainties in the success of design
efforts, in the possibility that a returned product could be remanufactured, and in environmental
policies over time. Uncertainties and information asymmetries will render further complexity to the
32
analysis of coordinating contracts. Finally, additional insights into EPR policy design can be facilitated
by endogenizing the policy parameters of the model.
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Appendix A: EPR Legislation and Manufacturer Responses
EPR Legislation for EEE in Japan:
The Specified Home Appliance Recycling (SHAR) Law in Japan, which was enacted in 1998 and which
fully came into force in 2001, legally assigns part of the responsibility for the end-of-life management
of products to producers. The scarcity of final disposal sites, the increase of EEE in the waste stream
and the inadequacy of existing treatment plants for handling EEE were the main driving forces for the
enactment of the Law. Under the program, manufacturers as well as importers of four large electrical
home appliance categories - televisions, refrigerators, air conditioners, and washing machines, are
required to take back their discarded products, dismantle them and recover components and material
that can be reused or recycled. The Ministerial Order sets reuse and recycling rate requirements
of between 50 to 60% by weight for respective products. This should be fulfilled by product reuse,
component reuse, and material recycling with a positive monetary value. Retailers are required by
law to take back used products when they sell similar new products, as well as products that they
themselves sold. End-users bear the responsibility of covering the costs for the end-of-life management
of the products they discard. In addition, the Law for Promotion of Effective Utilization of Resources
(in short, the Recycling Promotion Law), enacted in 1991, generally promotes various measures that
improve recycling and reuse. Under the law, manufacturers of specific product groups are advised
to take various types of measures. For instance, manufacturers of large electrical home appliances
that are now governed under the SHAR Law should take measures to facilitate design for ease-of-
disassembly and recycling. A revision of the Recycling Promotion Law came into force in April 2001
with its core being the promotion of the 3R (reduce, reuse, recycle) principle. The revision includes the
specification of five areas where certain measures should be taken and the type of products/industries
that fall under each area. Among these five areas, those that are relevant to EEE are the following: 1)
waste reduction through promotion of lesser material use and greater longevity of products, 2) reuse of
components and material recycling, and 3) collection and recovery of end-of-life products by industries.
Requirements set in the areas under 1 and 2 primarily relate to the design and use of materials in
products. Examples of such requirements include design for upgradability and longevity, reduction in
the number and quantity of components, use of common parts, use of recycled materials, establishment
of repair networks, increase of remanufacturing (use of recovered components), development of plans
for use of recovered components, design for ease-of-disassembly and ease-of-replacement, consideration
for safety issues, intelligent use of packaging material, and the provision of information. The take-
back requirements for computers from private households, with an accompanying advance disposal fee
system, started in October 2003.
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Responses by Japanese EEE Manufacturers:
The interviewed manufacturers19 use a combination of different tools, including design guidelines,
recyclability assessments, life-cycle assessments (LCA), and checklists, to evaluate the overall environ-
mental performance of products. Three common assessment areas include energy efficiency, reduction
of hazardous substances, and resource efficiency and recyclability. In general, product standards take
into consideration the content of existing and anticipated legislation, environmental performance of
suppliers, and the company’s own environmental policy. With regard to energy efficiency, LCA studies
conducted with CO2 emissions are used to assess environmental impacts during different phases of a
product’s life-cycle. Large home appliances, personal computers, and copying machines are among the
products whose CO2 emissions are highest during the use phase. The manufacturers described the link
between improved energy efficiency during the use phase of products and consumers’ direct economic
interests as a factor that drives them to focus on energy efficiency. Other factors that drive manufac-
turers to take a conscious look at energy efficiency include the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change and revisions of the Japanese legislation on energy efficiency. The
enhancement of resource efficiency and recyclability has been addressed through approaches such as
reduction of material use, extension of product life, ease of disassembly, reuse and recycling of compo-
nents and materials, and the use of recycled materials. Modular design, component reuse, design for
upgradability, reconditioning of products, and remanufacturing are among the typical measures taken
for prolonging a product’s economic life. For one manufacturer, 60% by weight of all the materials
used in a 1997 model of its copying machine consisted of reused components taken from the 1993
model. A producer of computers also started to collect components from old rental products for use
as spare parts. Collection and reuse of toner cartridges has been one of the common initiatives taken
by manufacturers of printers.
EPR Legislation for Automobiles in Sweden:
In the year 2000, about 159,000 passenger cars came to the end of their useful lives in Sweden. A
deposit-refund type system for cars was introduced in 1975 to deal with the problems of littering and
scrappers’ improper treatment of materials such as engine fluids. The system had been successful in
reducing the problem of littering and it provided scrappers with economic compensation for ensuring
environmentally appropriate treatment of scrap. However, the scheme was criticized for not provid-
ing incentives to car manufacturers to incorporate considerations for end-of-life management at the
design phase. In 1997, an EPR system called the Ordinance on Producer Responsibility for Cars was
19Fujitsu Limited, Hitachi Limited, Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation Limited, Mitsubishi Electric Corpora-
tion, NEC Corporation, Ricoh Company Limited, Sharp Corporation, Sony Corporation, and Toshiba Corporation.
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introduced via legislation, replacing the conventional deposit-refund system. The Ordinance makes
manufacturers and importers of cars in Sweden responsible for accepting end-of-life vehicles free of
charge to the customers. Manufacturers and importers are also responsible for the establishment of a
system that takes care of end-of-life vehicles, regardless of their age. A reuse and recycling target of
85% to be achieved by 2002 has been set, which will be extended to 95% beginning 2012.
Responses by Swedish Automobile Manufacturers:
Emissions and fuel consumption during the use phase were identified as important areas which the
interviewed manufacturers were working on.20 Legislation on emissions requirements in various coun-
tries, an increasing awareness of climate change, and demand from customers were mentioned as factors
explaining the importance of these areas. Materials such as aluminium, thermoset plastics with glass
fibers, and thermoplastics which contribute to light-weighting, were used to help improve fuel efficiency.
A truck manufacturer mentioned that its customers requested it to increase fuel efficiency and thus
help reduce CO2 emissions. The manufacturers also developed lists of hazardous substances that they
wished to phase out. They provided their suppliers with these lists as part of product specifications.
With regard to design for disassembly, the decrease of disassembly time was mentioned by manufactur-
ers as an important focus area. Manufacturers have established or are establishing internal workshops
where they can learn about the equipment and techniques used in disassembly, and the times and
costs involved. This would feed back into the process of design for end-of-life. With regard to reuse
of components, one manufacturer reconditioned old components taken out of used cars and sold them
as spare parts under its brand name. Another manufacturer employed a large disassembler for the
management of reused components, and relied on the disassembler to supply spare parts whenever
necessary. The enhancement of recyclability of components was another focus area identified by manu-
facturers. Apart from metals, which constitute an average of 75% of the weight of a car, the remaining
materials from used cars were earlier being shredded and sent to landfills as auto shredder residues.
One manufacturer conducted a pilot project with its suppliers where several types of materials were
scrapped in batches. These materials were shredded and ground, and were used by some suppliers to
make parts such as wheel housings and interiors. Measures such as avoidance and treatment of waste,
avoidance of hazardous substances such as lead and organic tin and the use of clean paint shops, were
also undertaken to reduce environmental impacts during the production phase.
20The Swedish automobile manufacturers interviewed were Saab Automobile AB, Volvo Car Corporation, and Volvo
Truck Corporation.
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Appendix B: Bellman Model
To determine whether or not customer replacement behavior is specific to our choice of the replacement
model, we examine properties of the customer’s optimal replacement interval with respect to the
replacement cost r and the operating cost gradient u, in the richer model of Bellman (1955) which
considers discounting. For conciseness, we present the analysis for the uncoordinated case in the
absence of EPR. Bellman proposes a profit-maximization formulation for the problem of evaluating the
optimal equipment replacement interval. Let f(t) denote the overall profit to the customer of operating
a product of age t under an optimal replacement policy. Let u(t) denote the cost of operating and
maintaining the product during period t and let φ denote the revenue earned per period by operating
the product. At each epoch t there are two courses of action. The product can be kept (K) for another
time period or, a remanufactured product could be purchased (P ). In the former case, f(t) satisfies
fK(t) = φ−u(t)+αf(t +1). In the latter case f(t) satisfies fP (t) = φ− r−u(0)+αf(1). Notice that
the process renews itself at each replacement instance. The functional equation for f(t) is
f(t) = max{K : φ − u(t) + αf(t + 1), P : φ − r − u(0) + αf(1)}
The customer’s optimal policy has the form - operate the product for η periods and then purchase a
replacement. This yields the following system of equations
f(0) = φ − u(0) + αf(1)
f(1) = φ − u(1) + αf(2)
...
f(η − 1) = φ − u(η − 1) + αf(η)
f(η) = φ − r − u(0) + αf(1)
Solving for f(1) recurrently we have,
f(1) = [φ − u(1)] + α[φ − u(2) + αf(3)]
= [φ − u(1)] + α[φ − u(2)] + α2[φ − u(3)] + . . . αη−2[φ − u(η − 1)] + αη−1[φ − r − u(0) + αf(1)]
=
φ




i−1u(i)] + αη−1[r + u(0)]
1 − αη (33)
The optimal replacement interval η∗ is the value of η which maximizes f(0) and, hence, f(1). We
show similarities in behavior between η∗ in the Bellman model and τ in the Clapham model. We
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(1 − α)2(1 − αη)3
To ensure that there exists a value of η that maximizes f(1), we require that ∂
2f(1)
∂η2
< 0. In other
words, we require that
u <
(1 − α)2| ln(α)|αη−1(1 + αη)r
| ln(α)|αη−1(1 + αη)η − 2αη−1(1 − αη) (34)
(34) implies that concavity of f(1) can be ensured by assuming u to be sufficiently small. Note that
the right hand side of (34) is > 0 ∀ η ≥ 1, α ∈ (0, 1). The optimal value of η obtained by equating
∂f(1)
∂η to 0 is
η∗ =
u[1 + LambertW(−e−ξ)] + | ln(α)|r(1 − α)2
| ln(α)|u (35)
where ξ = u+| ln(α)|r(1−α)
2
u > 1. The LambertW function is the inverse of the function f(W ) = We
W .
W (x) is real for x ≥ −1/e. The LambertW function in (35) returns a real value since ξ > 1 and, hence,
−e−ξ > −1/e. Also note that −1 < W (x) < 0 for x ∈ (−1/e, 0). Thus, the LambertW function in
(35) returns a value in the range (−1, 0). Proposition 8 provides properties of the customer’s optimal



























The above results are similar to those for τ in Proposition 1. The participation constraint for the
customer, analogous to that in (5), is fη∗(0) ≥ 0, or
φ
1 − α −
αu








1 − αη∗ ≥ 0 (36)
(36) is, however, analytically intractable to solve for r.
21f(1) is a discrete function of η. However, the duration of a “period” can be reduced to an arbitrarily small length
of time; the number of periods in a given time interval would correspondingly increase. In the limit, f(1) would be a
continuous function of η. We assume that the technical conditions necessary for interchanging limits and differentiation
hold.
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